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Introduction 
The government has presented to the Hural for its review and approval an investment agreement between the 
government and Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia Inc. the Mongolian company which will develop the Oyu Tolgoi mine. 
The Oyu Tolgoi mine is the single most important mineral investment in Mongolia to date and this is the ﬁrst
major investment agreement negotiated by the government since passage of the amended Minerals Law. For 
these reasons it merits careful review before approval or return to the government for further negotiation.
It is most notable in its implementation of the provision of the Mineral Law that provides for 34 percent state 
ownership of strategic mineral investments and its elimination of the windfall proﬁts tax on either gold or cop-
per. As provided by law the agreement stabilizes certain tax rates, but the Agreement modiﬁes existing law
in a number of other important respects, however, and imposes signiﬁcant restrictions on the government’s
interest in Oyu Tolgoi.
There are in fact two agreements. An investment agreement between the government and IMMI, the Mongo-
lian company which will hold the mining license for Oyu Tolgoi and develop the mine, and a second “sharehold-
ers” agreement between the government and a foreign corporation incorporated in the Virgin Islands that will 
own 66 percent of the stock of IMMI. The Virgin Islands company is controlled by the investors, Ivanhoe Mines 
Ltd. and the Rio Tinto group. The shareholder agreement provides for the sale of a 34 percent interest in IMMI 
to the government and also controls the rights that the government has pursuant to its ownership interest. It 
is contingent upon approval of the investment agreement by the Hural.
Evaluation of any investment agreement is difﬁcult and requires often difﬁcult judgments between sometimes
conﬂicting interests. Judgment of this agreement and the shareholders agreement is particularly difﬁcult. Many
of the provisions are open or not entirely clear in their meaning or intended application and the agreement ap-
plies over a very extended period of 30 years in which economic conditions, especially the price of copper and 
gold, may change signiﬁcantly. Moreover, although the government has announced certain summary ﬁgures
about the beneﬁts of the agreement to Mongolia, it has not made public its analysis so that it is impossible to
evaluate the announced beneﬁts or to determine how sensitive the results are to particular economic assump-
tions about the future.
This summary and the attached documents are intended to assist the Hural in evaluating the agreement and 
reaching a judgment as to whether it should be approved. The attachments include:
• An economic analysis of the agreement and the beneﬁts and returns to Mongolia and the investors.
Because neither the government nor Ivanhoe have made their economic model public, this analysis is 
based on a model developed by Robert Conrad of Duke University using available public information. 
(Attachment I)
• A detailed summary of comments and questions regarding the particular provisions of the investment 
agreement and the shareholders agreement. (Attachment II)
1  This Analytica brief was written by the Analytica’s staff members and contributed by the interns Felicity Butt, Mark O`Mahoney, Steven 
Houston, Alexander Ward and Pere Sola. 
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• A “primer” discussing the general issue of how to evaluate mineral agreements. (Attachment III)
• A discussion paper illustrating the increased risk exposure to Mongolia from investing government funds 
into mining equity as opposed to other development options. (Attachment IV)
• A table outlining elements of a reformed investment regime if the current agreement is deemed not sat-
isfactory. (Attachment V)
Analysis of the Agreements
In reaching its judgment regarding the agreement, the Hural should consider a number of factors. Our be-
ginning point is that Oyu Tolgoi should be developed and that it can be an important source of revenue to 
the government, a signiﬁcant employer especially during constructions, a stimulus to other investment in the
supply sector, and properly integrated into other planning an important stimulus to the development of the 
country’s transportation and power infrastructure. [Moreover, we believe that having investors which are public 
companies is an advantage.1  “Public” companies are required to make available to individual investors and the 
public ﬁnancial and other material information about their activities. Moreover, major international mining com-
panies such as Rio Tinto have generally subscribed to a number of environmental and other codes intended to 
promote better mining practices and sustainable development.2] Thus there are important beneﬁts here, but
they must be weighted against the costs.
Highlighted in this summary are certain economic, technical, and institutional questions that the Hural should 
consider.
Is It Fair?
The most fundamental question is whether the agreement is a fair. Does it strike the right balance between 
revenue to Mongolia in exchange for its copper and its gold and revenue to the investors to pay them for their 
capital, their management, their technology and the risks that they must bear.
The government might have entered into a stability agreement that simply conformed to existing law and 
provided ﬁscal stability and certain other assurances provided for in Article 29 of the Mineral Law. The agree-
ments, however, go far beyond that providing a much more extensive form of “stabilization” and most notably 
relieving IMMI of the windfall proﬁts tax on gold or copper if IMMI within ﬁve years builds a smelter to reﬁne
about 40 percent of the copper to be produced. In exchange for this and other concessions, however, the 
investors have allowed the government to acquire its interest at the same cost that the investors are paying 
for their interest.3
The question does not lend itself to a simple answer. Attachment 1 sets out one economic analysis. Figure 1 of 
that attachment illustrates Mongolia’s share of the value of the mine under three scenarios: 
(1) current law but without any equity ownership, 
(2) the investment agreement as submitted to the Hural, and 
(3) the investment agreement modiﬁed to imposed the windfall proﬁts tax.
1  “Public” companies are companies which have shares traded on organized security exchanges and which are subject to the listing and 
disclosure requirements of such exchanges. Such disclosure is particularly signiﬁcant for the major exchanges, e.g., New York Stock
Exchange, London Stock Exchange. Regulation is weaker in many smaller or more speculative exchanges. Although Ivanhoe Mines and 
Rio Tinto are listed on a number of exchanges, the agreements do not provide for listing the Mongolian company on any exchange 
and thus public information about the Mongolian company will not be available.
2  The agreements have no provisions preventing changes in control over the investment entity holding IMMI and hence there is no as-
surance that Rio Tinto or Ivanhoe will continue to be the owners of Oyu Tolgoi.
3  The interest is not “free” as some have suggested. The Government is required to pay its percentage of future capital calls, some of 
which may be used to repay debts already incurred. Thus, it will pay for its share of equity the same amount the investors are paying. 
Moreover, the interest is being granted in light of the other concessions the government is making, e.g., the give up of the windfall 
proﬁts tax.
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At a copper price of about $2.00 per pound ($4400 per metric ton) current law without any equity ownership 
and the agreement produce roughly the same revenue for the government. Below that price the contract is 
better and above that price current law would be better even without an equity interest. Better than both, of 
course, would be the agreement with the windfall proﬁts tax (or current law with an equity interest).
Whether the agreement is good or bad cannot, however, be determined simply by reference to existing law. 
Existing law may require too much -- the windfall proﬁts tax and a 34 percent equity interest. Or it may re-
quire too little and may leave the investor returns far above those that the investor would require to make the 
investment. For instance, in all of the cases studied the internal rate of return, a measure sometimes used to 
judge proﬁtability and required returns, is in excess of 40 percent, twice what the World Bank has advertised
as required returns for mining investments.
A special sub-issue is the exemption from the Windfall Proﬁts Tax. Even under existing law there is an exemp-
tion from the Windfall Proﬁts Tax for copper concentrate that is reﬁned within Mongolia, but that exemption
applies only to the copper concentrate actually reﬁned. It does not apply to copper concentrate exported prior
to the smelter coming into operation nor does it apply to copper concentrate which is not reﬁned after the
smelter is built. Yet in the agreements the government has given up all windfall proﬁt taxes on gold and copper
in exchange for a smelter which will only reﬁne a portion of the copper.
Other Considerations
Apart from the overall economics there are a number of other issues which the Hural must consider.
Excessive Stabilization. Current law permits stabilization of taxes but the agreements would except as 
speciﬁcally provided stabilize all laws and fees relating to Oyu Tolgoi from water down to the dog tax. This is
a 30 year agreement. Is it sensible and is it necessary to provide this degree of stabilization? Neither existing 
law nor experience elsewhere supports such sweeping stabilization.
Change of Control. Rio Tinto is a well known international company with many progressive elements, but 
there is nothing in the agreements that would prevent either Ivanhoe or Rio Tinto from indirectly selling their 
interest to other investors -- nationals of other countries, private equity funds, anyone. Although sales of 
shares in IMMI are restricted, Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe can transfer their interests simply by selling the shares 
of the Virgin Island’s holding company. Is it in Mongolia’s national interest to allow changes in control with-
out its approval?
Indeﬁniteness. Many critical areas dealing with infrastructure, the environment and other important 
development objectives are left open to be agreed in the future, but once the investments agreements are 
adopted the ability of the government to insist on items that may be costly to Ivanhoe but important to the 
country’s development will be limited. Should these items be left open? More generally there are many is-
sues of detail which can be important in determining what Mongolia will really get. Many of these issues are 
discussed in Attachment II.
Transparency. Through their control of the Board of IMMI, Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe are in control of the 
disclosure of all information about the company that the investors deem proprietary. In the Shareholders’ 
Agreement there is also no exception for disclosures required by Mongolian law. Although certain information 
is made available to the government directors they cannot share that information with the Hural or the pub-
lic without the investors’ permission. Given the importance of Oyu Tolgoi to the country consideration should 
be given to requiring public disclosure of ﬁnancial and other material information as if IMMI itself were a
public company, and the agreement should not be able to override Mongolian law.
Increased Exposure to Risk. Although widely heralded the equity interest that Mongolia receives actually 
increases the government’s future risks. Although paid for through dividends, the interest is not free. Mon-
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golia must pay its share of future capital costs. To do this Mongolia must divert resources away from other 
development purposes and is actually increasing its risk. Mongolia is already heavily dependent upon mining; 
using its own revenue to purchase equity interests in mining make it further dependent upon mining and 
mineral prices rather than diversifying the economy and its resources. This issue is illustrated in Attachment 
IV.
All of these issues and others are discussed in the more detailed analysis of the agreements set out in At-
tachment II.
Alternatives
If the Hural decides not to approve the agreements it may want to consider alternative regimes especially for 
taxation that may provide a better balance between the interests of the government and the investor. One 
set of alternative measures which could be used is set out in Attachment V. The attachment provides for bet-
ter deﬁnition of critical elements in the determination of the base for royalties and income taxes.
It also provides for two alternative supplemental taxes that would be applied during period of high prices or 
high proﬁtability. Both variations are intended to allow the investor a better opportunity to recover its invest-
ment before applying supplementary taxation. The ﬁrst would be a modiﬁed windfall proﬁts tax. Unlike the
current windfall proﬁts tax it would not apply during the early periods of an investment and would only be
imposed after the initial mining period or perhaps after the investment had reached certain levels of capital 
recovery. The alternative is a form of resource rent tax which comes into effect only when the investor has 
already earned a signiﬁcant return on its investment measured on a cash ﬂow basis. Such a tax would be
imposed only when the investor has already achieved some signiﬁcant rate of return. The trigger rate can be
individually negotiated or ﬁxed absolutely or by formula in law. Alternatively in certain competitive situations
awards are made to the bidder bidding the lowest “r”, the rate of return.
A ﬁnal element in the scheme would be the equity interest. Again there are two variations. In the ﬁrst the
government would purchase an equity interest in the investor. Such an equity interest would be completely 
liquid and would have value independently of Oyu Tolgoi. An alternative would be to have the shares of 
IMMI, the Mongolian company listed, with the government acquiring the 34 percent interest. In both cases 
the government would be paying full value of its shares and would be making explicit budget decisions about 
the allocation of its tax resources.
